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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                        
No. 04-2835
                        
LJINDON DURASEVIC,
                         Petitioner
v.
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
                                                                                      Respondent                                
                                                        
                         
Petition for Review of an Order of the
United States Department of Justice
Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA No. A95-144-753)
                        
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 29, 2005
                         
Before:  RENDELL, FUENTES and WEIS, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: October 20, 2005 )
                        
OPINION OF THE COURT
                        
RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
Mr. Ljindon Durasevic petitions for review of a decision by the Board of
2Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying Durasevic’s application for asylum, withholding
of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  In so ruling, the
BIA adopted and affirmed the decision of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”).  The BIA’s
jurisdiction arose under 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(b)(3) and 1240.15, which grants it appellate
jurisdiction over immigration judges’ decisions in removal proceedings.  We have
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  Inasmuch as we find that substantial evidence in the
record supports the findings of both the IJ and the BIA, we will deny Durasevic’s petition
for review.    
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mr. Durasevic, a native of Montenegro and an ethnic Albanian, states that he felt
discrimination as an ethnic Albanian from a young age when he and other Albanian
children were not allowed to speak Albanian among themselves and were otherwise
treated as second-class citizens.  Mr. Durasevic states that during the war in Kosovo, he
and his family gave aid to Kosovar refugees and the Kosovo Liberation Army (“KLA”),
providing food, clothes, and shelter in their home, and escorting them across the border to
Albania.  
Durasevic states that during 1998 and 1999 Serbian officers and paramilitary units
came to his house on several occasions searching for weapons and material that would
link his family to the KLA.  While the Serbian soldiers never found anything, they
violently assaulted Durasevic and his family, and threatened to kill them all.  In 1998,
As discussed infra, Durasevic testified regarding the date of this event variously1
as “in November” (A100), January 11, 2000 (A101), and October 19, 2000 (A101).  
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Durasevic refused to join the Serbian army, believing that he would be sent to fight
against fellow Albanians in the war in Kosovo.  Durasevic states that during that time he
was stopped and attacked on the streets on a daily basis.  He attempted to leave
Montenegro, but was unable to do so because he did not have the requisite travel
documents.  
Durasevic states that, after NATO troops forced the Serbian army out of Kosovo,
much of the Serbian army crossed into Montenegro to punish the Albanian population
there for providing aid to the KLA and to prevent Montenegro from breaking away.  
In a statement in support of his application for asylum, Durasevic states that a
Serbian paramilitary unit broke into his house on January 11, 2000.   The soldiers put him1
and his family against the wall and searched their house for weapons.  Unable to find any
weapons, the soldiers screamed at Durasevic and his family to tell them where the
weapons were hidden and about their involvement with the KLA.  One of the officers hit
Mr. Druasevic’s father in the head with the back of his rifle, causing him to fall bleeding
to the floor.  When Durasevic moved to help his father, he was struck on the head and
knocked unconscious.  He awoke the next day with a bandage around his head.  
Durasevic testified that a draft notice was delivered to his father.  His father did
not accept the notice, informing the officials who delivered it that Durasevic was not at
The INS no longer exists as an independent agency within the Department of2
Justice.  Its functions have been transfered to the Department of Homeland Security.  See
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 441, 116 Stat. 2135, 2192.
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home.  His father told Durasevic to flee before he could be forced into the army and
possibly shot.  Aware that two fellow Albanians from his region had been killed only
weeks after being forcefully drafted into the army, Mr. Durasevcic decided to flee
Montenegro as soon as he could obtain the necessary paperwork.  
After obtaining travel documents, Durasevic arrived in the United States on or
about December 30, 2000, entering the country from Canada at a point near Buffalo, New
York.  On July 18, 2001, Durasevic filed an application for political asylum.   On August
24, 2001, the Immigration and Naturalization Services (“INS”)  commenced removal2
proceedings against Durasevic, charging that he was removable under INA §
212(a)(6)(A))i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as an alien present in the United States
without being admitted or paroled by an immigration officer.  On June 22, 2003, an
immigration judge denied Durasevic’s application for political asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief under CAT.  On June 3, 2004, the BIA affirmed the decision.  
Durasevic states that, if he returns to Montenegro, he will be immediately arrested
and tried as a draft evader, and that he might be killed by the Serbian army without trial. 
He petitions for review.  
II.  SCOPE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Where the BIA issues a decision on the merits and not simply a summary
5affirmance, we review the decision of the BIA, rather than that of the IJ.  Li v. Attorney
General, 400 F.3d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 2005).  Where the BIA affirms the IJ’s decision
without opinion, we review the IJ’s decision.  Partyka v. Attorney General, 417 F.3d 408,
411 (3d Cir. 2005).  As here, where the BIA both adopts the findings of the IJ and
discusses some of the bases for the IJ’s decision, we review decisions of both the IJ and
the BIA.  He Chun Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2004).  Where the BIA
substantially relies on an IJ’s credibility determination, we must look to both decisions to
review the administrative decision meaningfully.  Xie v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 239, 242 (3d
Cir. 2004).  
The BIA’s decision in this case relied upon the findings made by the IJ.  The BIA
did not conduct a de novo review of the record to arrive independently at its conclusions. 
Therefore, inasmuch as the BIA deferred to the IJ’s findings and adopted the reasons the
IJ set forth for its determination, we will review both determinations.  See He Chun Chen,
376 F.3d at 222. 
We review the BIA’s legal determinations de novo, subject to established
principles of deference.  See Smriko v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 279, 282 (3d Cir. 2004).
Determinations that an alien experienced persecution or has a “well-founded fear of
persecution” are findings of fact and are reviewed under the substantial evidence
standard.  Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 483-84 (3d Cir. 2001).  Factual findings must
be upheld if they are “supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the
6record considered as a whole.”  INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992).  
Adverse credibility determinations are also reviewed for substantial evidence. Gao
v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2002).  Adverse credibility determinations based
purely on speculation or conjecture are reversible.  Id.  To support an adverse credibility
finding, discrepancies in an alien’s testimony must involve the “heart of the asylum
claim.”  Id. 
III. DISCUSSION
A.  The Immigration Court’s Decision
In her oral decision, the immigration judge reviewed Durasevic’s asylum
application and testimony.  (A50-53.)  The immigration judge found, after reviewing the
written submissions, testimony, and background documentation submitted in support of
Durasevic’s application, that he had not established that he has a “well-founded fear” of
future persecution if he were to be returned to Montenegro.  (A53.)  The IJ concluded that
Durasevic had not “presented a believable, consistent and sufficiently detailed claim as to
provide a plausible and coherent account of persecution within the meaning of the Act.” 
(A53.)  The IJ noted that “the meager testimony provided by this respondent is somewhat
contradictory from his written submission and he’s offered no plausible explanations for
the major discrepancies.”  (A53.)    In particular, the immigration judge noted that
Durasevic had testified that his house had been ransacked for weapons and he and his
father were attacked on October, 19 2000, but he had stated in his asylum application that
7this episode had occurred on January 11, 2000.  (A53-54.)  The immigration judge noted
that Durasevic had offered no explanation for this discrepancy beyond saying that he was
nervous and had made a mistake.  (A54.)  The immigration judge concluded that
Durasevic had presented “merely a whisper of a claim.”  (Trans. of Oral Decision at
A54.) 
The immigration judge also noted that the country conditions report generated by
the Department of State did not support Durasevic’s claims, finding that conditions in
Montenegro had stabilized and that Albanians “are a functioning intrical [sic] part of this
society.”  (Trans. of Oral Decision at A54.)  The IJ concluded that the totality of
Durasevic’s presentation did not support a grant of political asylum in the United States;
that consequently he had failed to meet the higher standard of withholding of removal;
and that he had not articulated any basis nor presented any evidence supporting relief
under the Convention Against Torture.  (A54-55.)  The BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ’s
decision in a single paragraph opinion.  (A02.)  
B.  Eligibility for Asylum
The Attorney General has discretion to grant asylum to an alien who is a
“refugee.”  8 U.S.C. § 1158(a).  An alien qualifies as a refugee if he or she is “unable or
unwilling” to return to his or her country “because of persecution or a well-founded fear
of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).  A showing of past persecution
8gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution.  8
C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1).  
Durasevic’s petition for review argues that we should reverse (1) the finding that
Durasevic has not established a well-founded fear of persecution and (2) the finding that
Durasevic has not met his burden for establishing a claim for alternative relief based on
withholding of removal.  Durasevic concedes that these issues are reviewed under the
substantial evidence standard.  (Petitioner’s Brief at 8.)
Durasevic argues that the IJ’s credibility determination was based on speculation,
placed too much emphasis on inconsistencies between Durasevic’s affidavit and
subsequent testimony, and lacked specific and cogent reasons for its finding.  (Pet. Br. at
10-11.)  An adverse credibility determination based on speculation or conjecture, rather
than on evidence in the record is reversible.  Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 249 (3d Cir.
2003) (en banc).  An IJ must support her adverse credibility findings with “specific,
cogent” reasons.  Id.  The immigration judge must not base an adverse credibility finding
solely on an inconsistency relating to a minor or tertiary matter which does not go to the
heart of the petitioner’s claim.  See Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 476 (3d Cir. 2003)
(cautioning against placing too much weight on inconsistencies between an asylum
affidavit and subsequent testimony at a hearing); Campos-Sanchez v. INS, 164 F.3d 448,
450 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[I]nconsistencies of less than substantial importance for which a
plausible explanation is offered cannot form the sole basis for an adverse credibility
9finding.” (internal quotations omitted)).  
Here, however, the immigration judge’s adverse credibility finding was not based
on a single, unimportant inconsistency, but rather on an inconsistency as to the
chronology of the very events which Durasevic put forward as supporting his asylum
claim.  The inconsistency touched the “heart” of his claim for asylum.  The IJ’s adverse
credibility determination was a reasonable interpretation of evidence presented and we
will not disturb it under the substantial evidence standard of review.  
The immigration judge’s credibility finding was supplemented with a finding that
Durasevic’s had presented merely a “whisper of a claim” and that “nothing substantive
has been offered to support his claim of persecution.”  (Trans. Oral Decision at A54.) 
Nothing in the record compels a contrary conclusion. 
Durasevic also argues that the immigration court erred in finding that the country
conditions did not support his claim.   (Pet. Br. at 12-13.) He points to statements in the
country report that police beat, abused, and arbitrarily arrested and detained citizens. 
(Pet. Br. at 13.)  However, the country report also stated that Montenegro’s government
generally respected the human rights of its citizens and that, though discrimination against
ethnic minorities continued to be a problem, it had decreased.  (A168-69.)  The report
also stated that there were no reports of arbitrary or unlawful deprivations of life
committed by the Republic Government or its agents.  (A169.)   Under substantial
evidence review, we cannot conclude the immigration judge’s finding was unreasonable
10
in light of the evidence provided. 
Durasevic argues further that the IJ erred in relying too heavily on the State
Department’s country report.  (Pet. Br. at 13-14.)  However, we find no indication that the
immigration judge placed undue emphasis on the country report.  Rather, the IJ appears to
have considered the country report as one factor in its determination, along with the
discrepancy in Durasevic’s statements and the “meager” testimony and other evidence
presented by him.  
The record also includes a letter from the Consul General of the United States
Embassy in Belgrade.  (A112.)  The Consul General observes that the Albanian
community has a large degree of cultural autonomy and that a significant proportion of
judges, police, and other officials are of Albanian ethnicity.  The Consul General also
notes that Montenegro has a high unemployment rate and that ethnic Albanians engage in
a “persistent pattern” of “chain migration” to the United States.  Fraudulent documents
are sold openly in marketplaces and traffickers coach migrants to ask for asylum.  
The determinations made by the immigration judge in this case– as in many
immigration cases– are not easy.  Were we to review the immigration court’s decision de
novo, we might arrive at a different conclusion.  However, we find that the immigration
judge’s conclusion that Durasevic does not meet the requirements for a grant of asylum is
a reasonable interpretation of evidence presented and we will not disturb it under the
substantial evidence standard of review.  
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C.  Eligibility for Withholding of Removal
The Attorney General must grant withholding of removal to an alien who
demonstrates a “clear probability” that, upon repatriation, his or her life or freedom
would be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion.  8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3); Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d
215, 223 (3d Cir. 2004).  Because this is a higher standard than that for asylum, an
applicant who does not qualify for asylum also does not qualify for withholding of
removal.  Id.  Since Durasevic failed in his claim for asylum, he also fails in his claim for
withholding of removal.
D.  Relief Under the CAT
To qualify for relief under the CAT, an alien must demonstrate that it is more
likely than not that he or she would be tortured if returned to the proposed country of
removal.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.16.  The IJ found that Durasevic “has not articulated any basis
nor presented any evidence for this Court to conclude that it would be “more likely than
not” that if he were removed to Montenegro he would be tortured in Montenegro.” 
(Trans. Oral Decision at A55.)  No evidence in the record compels us to revisit the IJ’s
conclusion.  
III.  Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny Durasevic’s petition for review of the
BIA’s order.
